Secure Boot on Arm systems

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Agenda

- Introduction & Scope of work
- Arm Trusted Board Boot (PKI, CoT, Authentication Flow)
- Arm Trusted Firmware implementation
- UEFI Secure Boot (PKI, CoT, Authentication Flow)
- UEFI Secure Boot on Arm – EDK2 recap
- Complete CoT
- Secure Variable Storage
- Other OSS Solutions (Android, U-Boot)
- Next steps
Introduction

- Secure Boot → a mechanism to build (and maintain!) a complete Chain of Trust on all the software layers executed in a system, preventing malicious code to be stored and loaded in place of the authenticated one

- Security through existing specifications, industry standards & OSS
  - Interoperability (same OS/Software on different Platforms/Firmware)
  - Common Secure Boot and Secure Firmware Update Interfaces → Reduced integration effort
  - Stability, frequent updates, wide usage → Reduced maintenance cost

Enterprise/Networking

Mobile/Client

Embedded

Whole ARMv8-A Ecosystem
Scope of Work

ARMv8-A Architecture

Apps
Trusted Apps

OS
Trusted OS

UEFI Firmware
Arm Trusted Firmware

Hardware

Apps

OS/RTOS

Trusted Software

TrustZone

Extended Root of Trust

iROT

TrustZone

CryptoCell

Keys

TrustZone

based TEE

UEFI

TBBR

TBSA & RoT

Linaro connect
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ENGINEERS AND DEVICES WORKING TOGETHER
Arm Trusted Board Boot vs UEFI Secure Boot

- **TWO DISTINCT MECHANISMS:** different Key/Certificates & PKI
- **SAME GOAL:** verifying the authenticity and integrity of a software/firmware image before allowing its runtime execution
- **DIFFERENT TARGET IMAGES**
- Combined together they enable a full Secure Boot establishing a complete Chain Of Trust (despite different PKI) from the very first firmware executed up to the OS
Arm Trusted Board Boot

- Based on Arm TBSA/TBRR documents (available under NDA)
  - TBBR-Client specification (DEN0006C) reference for Arm Trusted Firmware implementation

- Arm TBB: a reference example on how to build a CoT from the very first ROM firmware executed (BL1) up to the first normal world firmware (BL33)

- SBBR recent implications (ARMServerAC):
  - v1.1 will generically mandate the use of a “complete cascading Chain of Trust from the initial firmware up to the first normal world firmware”
  - Arm TBB and Arm Trusted Firmware provide a reference implementation
  - Other 3rd party solutions (BL1/BL2) will also be accepted as long as they start from an HW RoT and allow a complete verification up to the UEFI compliant firmware (BL33)
Arm Trusted Firmware TBB – PKI Details

- 2 implicitly trusted components (tamper proof)
  1. Root Of Trust Public Key (ROTPK) with SHA-256 hash stored on trusted registers
  2. Boot Loader Stage 1 (BL1) stored on trusted ROM

- 2 Certificates pairs for each BL3x image
  1. Key Certificate
     ■ Holds the BL3x_{pub} key needed to validate the corresponding Content Certificate
  2. Content Certificate
     ■ Holds the BL3x image hash to be verified against the hash of the loaded image

- 2 Key pairs used to sign/validate Key Certificates
  1. Trusted World Key pair (TW_{pub/priv}) used for BL31 & BL32 Key Certificates
  2. Normal World Key pair (NW_{pub/priv}) used for BL33 Key Certificate

- Public Keys and hashes are included as extensions to X.509 certificates
- Certificates are self-signed: no need for a valid CA
Arm Trusted Firmware TBB – Authentication Flow

- BL1 responsible for authenticating BL2 stage
  1. BL1 verifies ROTPK in BL2 Content Certificate against ROTPK stored hash
  2. BL1 verifies BL2 Content Certificate using enclosed ROTPK
  3. BL1 loads BL2 and performs its hash verification
  4. Execution is transferred to BL2

- BL2 responsible for authenticating BL3x stages (BL31, BL32, BL33)
  1. BL2 verifies ROTPK in Trusted Key Certificate against ROTPK stored hash
  2. BL2 verifies Trusted Key Certificate using enclosed ROTPK and saves $TW_{pub}/NTW_{pub}$
  3. BL2 verifies BL3x (BL31/BL32) Key Certificate using $TW_{pub}$
  4. BL2 verifies BL3x (BL31/BL32) Content certificate using enclosed BL3x$_{pub}$ key
  5. BL2 extracts and saves BL3x hash used for BL3x (BL31/BL32) image verification
  6. BL2 verifies BL33 Key Certificate using $NTW_{pub}$
  7. BL2 verifies BL33 Content certificate using enclosed BL33$_{pub}$ key
  8. BL2 extracts and saves BL33 hash used for BL33 image verification
    ○ Execution is transferred to verified BL3x → BL33 images
Arm Trusted Firmware TBB – How it works (BL1)

Implicitly Trusted components

Secure ROM

BL1

Reset

TRusted Key Cert

ROTPK

BL2

BL1

BL2

Secure world Images

Normal world

BL33

BL33

BL3x

BL3x

BLx

Secure world Images

Legenda

Hash check

Exec

BL images

Key Certs

Content Certs

EL2 Execution

S-EL1 Execution

EL3 Execution

BL KeyPub

BLx HASH
Arm Trusted Firmware TBB – How it works (BL2)

Implicitly Trusted components

Secure ROM

BL1

Reset

Secure world Images

Normal world

Legenda

Hash check

Exec

BL images

Key Certs

Content Certs

BL33

BL33_pub

BL33_priv

BL33_HASH

EL2 Execution

S-EL1 Execution

EL3 Execution

BL_keyPub

BLx_HASH

For each BL3x stage

1. ROTPK_SHA-256

2. Secure ROM

3. Implicitly Trusted components

4. Secure world Images

5. Normal world
Arm Trusted Firmware TBB – How it works (BL2)

Implicitly Trusted components

Secure ROM
BL1

Reset

Trusted Key Cert

ROTPK

TW_

NW_

BL2

HASH

ROTPK

SHA-256

Secure world Images

BL2

BL3x

Normal world

BL33

PB

BL33

HASH

Legenda

Hash check

Exec

BL images

Key Certs
Content

Certs

BL3x

6

8

7

EL2 Execution
S-EL1 Execution
EL3 Execution

BL KeyPub
BLx HASH
Arm Trusted Firmware TBB – How it works (BL3x)

Implicitly Trusted components

Secure ROM BL1

Reset

Trusted Key Cert

ROTPK
TW\textsubscript{pub}
NW\textsubscript{pub}
ROT\textsubscript{priv}

BL2\textsubscript{HASH}
ROT\textsubscript{priv}

Secure world Images

BL3x\textsubscript{pub}
TW\textsubscript{priv}

BL3x\textsubscript{HASH}
BL3x\textsubscript{priv}

Normal world

BL33\textsubscript{pub}
NW\textsubscript{priv}

BL33\textsubscript{HASH}
BL33\textsubscript{priv}

Legenda

Hash check

Exec

BL images

Key Certs

Content Certs

EL2 Execution
S-EL1 Execution
EL3 Execution

BL\textsubscript{KeyPub}
BL\textsubscript{x}\textsubscript{HASH}
Arm Trusted Firmware TBB – How it works (BL33)

Implicitly Trusted components

Secure ROM

Secure world Images

Legenda

Hash check

Exec

BL images

Key Certs

Content Certs

Normal world
Arm Trusted Firmware Implementation Overview

- TBB working properly on BL1/BL2 on both AArch64 & AArch32!
  - JUNO and FVP Platforms TBB example running in AArch32 state on GitHub!

- Build flags (summary)
  - `TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1` to enable BL1+BL2 TBB support
  - `GENERATE_COT=1` build and execute `cert_create` tool (see below)
  - `XXX_KEYS=[path]` used to specify location of keys in PEM format
  - Have a look at the user guide\(^{(1)}\)!

- Tools:
  - `cert_Create` tool: BL images and Keys as input → Certificates as output
  - `Fiptool`: Certificates as input → FIP (Firmware Image Package)

- Pre-integration of TBB with the Arm TrustZone CryptoCell product (CC-712) to take advantage of its HW RoT and crypto acceleration services
UEFI Secure Boot

1. A platform ownership model for establishing a trust relationship among:
   ■ Platform Owner (ODM/OEM/EndUser) – PO
   ■ Platform Firmware (EDK2 / U-Boot / 3rd party BIOS) – PF
   ■ OS / 3rd party software vendors – OSV/ISV → SV
     ○ Uses standard PKI, X.509 certificates and PE images digital signature, based on PE digest/hash calculation described in Microsoft Authenticode PE Signature Format
     ○ Signature database (white/black list) update mechanism from trusted sources

2. A generic framework, based on the above model, to allow:
   1. The firmware to authenticate UEFI executable images before allowing their execution, preventing pre-boot malwares to be run
   2. The Platform Owner and/or SV to securely update the signature databases into PF with new/known allowed/forbidden image signatures
**UEFI Secure Boot – PKI details**

- **2 asymmetric key pairs:**
  1. **Platform Key (PK):** Trust relationship between PO & PF
     - $\text{PK}_{\text{priv}}$ owned by the PO
     - $\text{PK}_{\text{pub}}$ enrolled into PF
  2. **Key Exchange Key (KEK):** Trust relationship between SV & PF
     - Different $\text{KEK}_{\text{priv}}$ for each SV
     - Each SV enrolls $\text{KEK}_{\text{pub}}$ into PF

- **Platform firmware NV variables (on tamper proof storage)** to hold:
  - $\text{PK}_{\text{pub}}$ / $\text{KEK}_{\text{pub}}$ list
  - Signatures DBs: signatures white/black lists (db/dbx)
UEFI Secure Boot – PKI details (2)

- Using $PK_{priv}/KEK_{priv}$, Signature_DB is updated from trusted sources with allowed/forbidden image signatures, by means of UEFI SetVariable() Runtime service.
UEFI Secure Boot – How it works

- UEFI executable images are verified against Signature_DBs found in the firmware.
UEFI Secure Boot on Arm – EDK2 recap

- LCA14 (from Ard Biesheuvel)\(^{(2)}\)
- LAS16 (Ard Biesheuvel)\(^{(3)}\)

### UEFI Secure Boot on ARM

Current status:
- proof of concept implementation available in QEMU/Vexpress
  - requires EFI stub patches that are not yet upsteam
  - requires an updated sbsigntool that allows to sign arm64 PE/COFF images (available in Linaro CI)
  - instructions can be found here: [https://wiki.linaro.org/ardbiesheuvel/UefiSecureBootPrototype](https://wiki.linaro.org/ardbiesheuvel/UefiSecureBootPrototype)
- Tianocore Authenticated Variable Store
  - TrustZone/Secure World
  - if the Secure World 'owns' the WRITE_ENABLE, it should also perform the authentication of the updates itself

### UEFI Secure Boot - current status on AArch64

- Essentially the same as a year ago
  - Software layers above the non-volatile variable store are working and regression tested through CI (both AArch64 and ARM)
  - No implementation exists to make the non-volatile variable store tamper proof and replay protected, as the UEFI Secure Boot spec requires
- What is holding us back?
  - Spec based reference implementation of the tamper proof varstore requires (S)MM support, which is not even in the spec yet for AArch64.
  - Non-spec based ref implementation is likely too platform specific, which complicates sharing between members and/or open sourcing
- Is there a plan B?
  - External manipulation of PK/KEK/db/dbx variables, while making them immutable from the OS/firmware pov. Stop gap solution, but effective
Complete CoT – Putting all together

Normal World

EL0
Guest App1
Guest App2

EL1
Linux Kernel A
Linux Kernel B

EL2
UEFI Firmware – BL33
PK_{pub}
KEK_{pub}
db / dbx

EL3
Arm Trusted Firmware – BL31

Secure World

S-EL0
Secure App1
Secure App2

S-EL1
S-EL1 payload (BL32)

TBB BL2
CC

TBB BL1
KC
CC

Sign1
Sign2

PK
pub
KEK
pub
db
/dbx

ROTPK
SHA-256

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Secure Variable access

Normal World

EL0
Guest App1

EL1
Linux Kernel A

SetVariable()

EL2
UEFI Firmware – BL33

Arm MM Interface

EL3
Arm Trusted Firmware – BL31

Secure World

Secure Partition Variable access

SVC Trampoline – BL31

BL31
Secure Storage

PK pub

KEK pub

db / dbx

TBB BL2

TBB BL1

S-EL0

S-EL1

Secure Partition Manager

ROTPK

SHA-256

EL0
Guest App2

EL1
Linux Kernel B

TBB

EL2

UEFI Firmware – BL33

Arm MM Interface

EL3
Arm Trusted Firmware – BL31
Other OSS Solutions

- **Android Verified Boot**\(^4\) on AOSP:
  - De-facto industry standard for Mobile secure boot path since Android 4.4/5.0
  - CoT starting from OEM public key (tamper proof) to verify android boot image
  - Device State (LOCKED/UNLOCKED) must be protected not to break the CoT
  - On newer versions (8.0) also Rollback protection available\(^5\)

- **U-Boot Verified Boot**\(^6\)
  - CoT starting from trusted U-Boot image (BL33) carrying initial public key (tamper proof)
  - Usual image verification chain then follows
  - No specified platform ownership model for updating keys in field

- **U-Boot Secure Boot?**
  - Leveraging “*UEFI on Top on U-Boot*”\(^7\) work, with SetVariable extension?
  - Plugging shim over UEFI-enabled U-Boot to handle key management?
  - → **Convergence of Embedded and Enterprise secure boot flows!**
Plans & Next Steps

● Software side:
  ○ Arm open-source reference platform software of TBB+UEFI Secure Boot with Secure Variable storage access from Secure Partition
  ○ Investigate U-Boot based solution for Embedded/Mobile
  ○ Future: Secure Firmware Update (FWU vs UEFI Signed Capsule Update)

● Specification side:
  ○ TBBR/SBBR updates & possible Server side TBBR/TBSA
  ○ Interactions with TCG TPM & Measured Boot
  ○ What level of standardization required on the Firmware side for a TBB solution?
    ■ A guidance on which authentication steps to be executed at each ELx/BLx to avoid arbitrary code execution at EL3\(^8\)?

● Different HW solutions for the initial RoT (→ SFO17-304)
References

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   ○ https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/docs/trusted-board-boot.rst
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   ○ https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/docs/user-guide.rst

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3) LAS16-200: UEFI Secure Boot

4) Android Verified Boot: https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/

5) AVB Codebase and latest updates: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/

6) U-Boot Verified Boot: https://lwn.net/Articles/571031/

7) UEFI on Top of U-Boot:
   ○ https://www.suse.com/docrep/documents/a1f0ledpbe/UEFI%20on%20Top%20of%20U-Boot.pdf

8) UCSB Mobile Boot Loaders Analysis and TEE implementation flaws
   ○ https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity17/technical-sessions/presentation/redini
Thank You
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